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Introduction 
 
Samuelson’s discounted utility (DU) model was introduced in 1937 and applied 
for policies (e.g. Cost-Benefit Analysis) until recent times and generally 
accepted as a model which can describe actual intertemporal behavior 
representing it in one parameter (social discount rate, SDR). But over the last 
decades a lot of empirical research (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Chapman, 
Lazaro et al., 2002) have documented anomalies in intertemporal choices. The 
most important discovery is that the discount rates are not constant over time, 
but are decreasing and seem to follow a hyperbolic curve. In addition, there are 
several observed anomalies in responses (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), 
namely: (1) sign effect (gains are discounted more than losses); (2) magnitude 
effect (small amounts are discounted more than large amounts); (3) 
delay/speedup asymmetry (greater discounting is shown to avoid delay of a 
good than to expedite its receipt); (4) improving sequences (in choices over 
sequences of outcomes, improving sequences are often preferred to declining 
sequences though positive time preference dictates the opposite); (5) violations 
of independence and preference for spread (in choices over sequences, 
violations of independence are pervasive, and people seem to prefer spreading 
consumption over time). Beyond those anomalies, time effect (inverse 
relationship between time horizon and discount rates) and domain effects 
(different discount rates are used for different goods, e.g. money, health) can be 
observed in case of long-term stated time preferences (Chapman, 1996).  
 
Chapman (2001), Lazaro et al. (2002), Hendrickx and Nicolaij (2004), 
Berndsen and Pligt (2001) conducted their studies on students and revealed their 
time preferences on various topics. Lazaro et al. (2002) found that stated 
preferences do not correspond with the behavior predicted by the axioms of 
Samuelson’s discounted utility model and their results also underpin the 
assumptions of time effect, magnitude effect and delay/speed-up asymmetry in 
social intertemporal decisions.  
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Chapman (2001) has undertaken 3 experiments among a sample of students 
and studied the difference between intergenerational and intragenerational 
discounting behavior. Despite the assumption that the intergenerational discount 
rates should be lower, empirical research shows similar parameters for both 
time intervals (Chapman, 2001). 
 
Svenson and Karlsson (1989) as well as Hendrickx and Nicolaij (2004) 
investigate the connection of temporal discounting and environmental risks. 
Hendrickx and Nicolaij (2004) focus on the ethical and loss-relating concerns 
related to risk evaluation. Svenson and Karlsson (1989) analyze the significance 
of time horizons and the discounting of negative consequences using a decision 
theoretic framework. Both empirical studies found that the majority of people 
did not discount environmental risks.  
 
Our study is based on representative sample of 1000 elements, in contrast to 
other authors, who have undertaken their studies on samples of students. We 
consider that students would not represent the actual attitudes of all social 
clusters, although they would give us proper and accurate answers. Our survey 
is representative for the Hungarian population regarding gender, age and 
income.  
 
The questions in the survey aim to measure personal preferences through 
getting rewards in the future and also try to capture the personal preferences 
which concern common decisions mainly through allocation of common costs 
over time. We also attempt to reveal the long term intergenerational time 
preferences through saving lives and the last type of question investigates the 
willingness to pay (WTP) of people about the future costs of climate change.  
 
 
Methods 
 
As described above, each questionnaire consists of 4 types of questions and 
each question type contains 11 pairs of 2 alternatives which arranged on an 
ordinal scale. Thus, it is possible to investigate respondents’ “switching point” 
where they switch from alternative “A” to alternative “B”. For example, the first 
type of question assumes a hypothetical situation, where the respondent wins a 
certain amount of money, and has to decide when he/she wants to receive it. 
Alternative “A” involves receiving 100 000 HUF immediately while alternative 
“B” involves receiving a bigger amount 1 year later (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Sample of questions (Winning money 1 year delay) 
 A B 
Choice 
  
 I get NOW I get in 1 YEAR 
Do not 
know 
X 
a. 100 000 HUF 100 000 HUF A      B 9 X 
b. 100 000 HUF 101 000 HUF A      B 9 X 
c. 100 000 HUF 102 000 HUF A      B 9 X 
d. 100 000 HUF 103 000 HUF A      B 9 X 
e. 100 000 HUF 104 000 HUF A      B 9 X 
f. 100 000 HUF 105 000 HUF A      B 9 X 
g. 100 000 HUF 106 000 HUF A      B 9 X 
h. 100 000 HUF 110 000 HUF A      B 9 X 
i. 100 000 HUF 115 000 HUF A      B 9 X 
j. 100 000 HUF 120 000 HUF A      B 9 X 
k. 100 000 HUF 125 000 HUF A      B 9 X 
 
The second type of question refers to social decisions related to flood 
protection. The hypothetical situation is the following: “Imagine that the state 
offers a certain amount of money to villages along the river Tisza, which has to 
be spent on flood protection. If the subsidy is asked for immediately, the state 
can offer a lower amount, if you wait 1 or 10 years, villages will get a larger 
sum, which makes more efficient protection possible (e.g. stronger dams). What 
is your decision?” The purpose of this question is to reveal people’s attitude to 
urgent and pressing situations, where it is important to act as soon as possible. 
Our assumption is that in such a decision situation, where intervention is urgent, 
using time preference rates is meaningless or using stated preferences will lead 
to a paradox exchange: the quicker the intervention should be, the higher the 
time preference rate, which induces decisions for postponing actions. 
 
The third question type deals with saving lives, using the following 
hypothetical situation: “Imagine that you have to decide between two programs, 
which financially support medicine and therapy researches. In case of Program 
“A” an already existing treatment is supported, which can save 100 lives 
immediately. Program “B” supports medicine researches, which could help 
more than 100 people in 1, 30 or 100 years to stay alive. What is your 
decision?” 
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The last group of questions, regarded as the most abstract or hypothetical, 
deals with the financial consequences of climate change: “Imagine that you 
have to choose from two options regarding climate costs. Option “A” is that, 
from now on, you pay a certain amount annually (to cover the costs of climate 
change), and option “B” involves postponing the costs and paying  1 million 
HUF (in 10 years) or 10 million Ft (in 30 years), when the catastrophic 
consequences of climate change occur. What is your decision?” 
 
In all cases, inflation is ignored, 1 HUF now is equal to 1 HUF in the future.  
 
In Table 2 the four types of questions are summarized by temporality, 
involvement, type of outcome and time horizons.  
 
Table 2. Types of questions 
 Domain 
Type of 
discounting 
Invol- 
vement 
Type of outcome 
Time 
intervals 
Winning 
money 
money short term, 
intragenerational 
personal postponing reward 1, 3, 10 
years 
Flood risk short term 
intragenerational 
social avoiding costs 1, 10 years 
Saving 
lives 
health long term, 
intergenerational 
social saving lives 
(postponing reward) 
1, 30, 100 
years 
Climate 
costs 
money/risk long term, 
intergenerational 
personal postponing costs 10, 30 years 
 
Discount rates have been calculated according to the following equation: 
 
, 
 
where n is the number of years implied in the choice. The indifference point is 
the point where the respondent switches from one alternative to another 
(Chapman, 2001). The indifference number stands with the last preferred 
immediate benefit (alternative “A”), before alternative “B” is chosen, e.g. if 
winning 115 000 HUF in 1 year is preferred to getting 100 000 HUF now, but 
100 000 HUF now is preferred to getting 110 000 HUF in 1 year, then the 
indifference point is 110 000 HUF.  
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Results 
 
Although 1012 individuals completed the questionnaire, there were missing 
values and in many cases the results were not appropriate for analysis for 
different reasons. It often occurred that respondents chose two or more 
switching points, which are not consistent in an ordinal scale, or they did not 
switch from one alternative to another. The latter event could happen for several 
reasons: (1) respondents do not want to discount at all (2) the scale is not wide 
enough, thus they could not find their indifference point (3) respondents do not 
understand the situation or (4) they do not want to make a decision. Thus, the 
inconsistent and unusable replies were coded as “do not know” and excluded 
from the analysis. 
 
Table 3 shows the number of respondents, the minimum and maximum value 
of discount rates, their means, and standard deviations by question types. Time 
delays are different because of the various topics, and the involvement of the 
people.  
 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted between time delays within 
each question group. The results of RM ANOVA suggest that the time delays 
within all question groups significantly differ from each other (Greenhouse-
Geisser and Huynh-Feldt tests show p=0.000 significance level), but according 
to the pairwise comparisons of means by Bonferroni correction in “winning 
money” the means of time delays 1 and 3 years do not differ statistically (p = 
0.546).  
 
In case of ‘Saving lives’ and ‘Climate costs’ scenario, we have long term 
(intergenerational) discount rates, and we can observe that the rates fall as the 
delay increases (time effect), and there is a significant difference between the 
discounting of money and health (domain effect). The high rate for flood in a 1 
year delay implies a preference for early intervention and the very low number 
of responses in favour of a 10 year delay also correspond with findings of other 
research by Svenson and Karlsson (1989) as well as Hendrickx and Nicolaij 
(2004), illustrating that the majority of people do not discount environmental 
risks, where they could be involved personally.  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
winning money  
in 1 year 
335 0.00 0.25 0.1440 0.08247 
winning money  
in 3 years 
423 0.00 0.26 0.1406 0.08119 
winning money  
in 10 years 
541 0.00 0.26 0.1674 0.07641 
flood occurs in 1 year 361 0.00 0.67 0.2934 0.19138 
flood occurs  
in 10 years 
47 0.00 0.13 0.0474 0.04346 
saving lives in 1 year 584 -0.10 0.25 0.0806 0.10189 
saving lives in 30 years 385 0.00 0.09 0.0503 0.02999 
saving lives  
in 100 years 
355 0.00 0.05 0.0293 0.01698 
climate change costs 
incur in 10 years 
302 0.01 0.35 0.1681 0.10161 
climate change costs 
incur in 30 years 
300 0.03 0.15 0.0915 0.03553 
 
In our questionnaire, respondents were asked about happiness, life 
satisfaction, general attitude to the environment (5 questions) and personal data 
(gender, age, number of children, qualification, net income) as well. The 
questions about happiness and life satisfaction were measured on a scale from 1 
to 10 where 1 means “unhappy/dissatisfied” and 10 means “very happy/very 
satisfied”. The general attitude questions tried to reveal how people evaluate our 
environment and what they think should be done to preserve our natural 
resources for the next generations. Respondents were asked to decide on a 5 
grade scale (1 – totally disagree, 5 – totally agree) whether they agree or 
disagree with the following statements: 
 
1. The state is responsible for preserving our natural resources. (“state”) 
2. It is everybody’s right to use natural resources for private purposes. (“pri-
vate”) 
3. I believe that technological development and innovations will solve the 
environmental problems. (“innov”) 
4. We should radically change our consumption behavior in order to pre-
serve our environment. (“change”) 
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5. People must ensure that natural resources will be available for the next 
generations. (“nextgen”). 
 
A one-way ANOVA method was conducted in each question group (winning 
money, flood, saving lives, climate costs), using discount rates as dependent 
variables. Independent variables were gender, age, net income, qualification, 
happiness and attitude questions about environmental problems (Table 4 
contains only those variables which have statistically significant results).  
 
No connection could be observed between time discounting and gender: 
women and men use the same discount rates. There was absolutely no statistical 
connection between age, number of children and time discounting behavior. 
 
Table 4. One-way ANOVA for variables (sig. levels) 
 Income 
Qualifi- 
cation 
Hap- 
piness 
“State” 
“Pri- 
vate” 
“Innov” “Change” “Nextgen” 
winning 
money  
in 1 year 
0.288 0.016 0.167 0.002 0.806 0.000 0.000 0.000 
winning 
money  
in 3 years 
0.139 0.001 0.223 0.040 0.384 0.585 0.013 0.000 
winning 
money  
in 10 years 
0.030 0.217 0.017 0.021 0.001 0.052 0.003 0.000 
flood occurs in 
1 year 
0.144 0.903 0.097 0.878 0.684 0.000 0.022 0.187 
flood occurs in 
10 years 
0.420 0.042 0.069 0.384 0.397 0.186 0.282 0.225 
saving lives  
in 1 year 
0.236 0.095 0.055 0.003 0.011 0.001 0.007 0.000 
saving lives  
in 30 years 
0.031 0.005 0.038 0.269 0.175 0.087 0.000 0.000 
saving lives  
in 100 years 
0.046 0.503 0.209 0.175 0.158 0.256 0.039 0.000 
climate 
change costs 
incur  
in 10 years 
0.030 0.268 0.123 0.908 0.414 0.351 0.015 0.287 
climate 
change costs 
incur  
in 30 years 
0.167 0.049 0.056 0.930 0.713 0.483 0.007 0.045 
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In cases of net income, qualification and happiness we can observe a very 
weak connection with time preference rates, but the strongest relationships are 
apparent when we look at the attitude questions, especially „change” and 
„nextgen”.  
 
In order to reveal the correlations between the variables and be able to cluster 
our sample, principle components analysis was conducted on all variables. The 
varimax rotation resulted in six factors, which explained 72.18 % of variance 
(number of factors selected by Mineigen criterion). Factor 1 consists of 
qualification and net income (income factor), Factor 2 includes happiness and 
life satisfaction (happiness factor), Factor 3 contains 2 attitude questions: 
“change” and “nextgen” (change factor), Factor 4 consists of the other 3 attitude 
questions: “state”, “private” and “innov” (state factor), Factor 5 includes age 
and the number of children (age factor) and finally, Factor 6 contains gender 
(gender factor). A two-step cluster analysis was carried out on the 1012-
element-representative sample, based on 4 factors: income, change, state and 
happiness (gender and age factors were excluded because as a result of the one-
way ANOVA analysis they do not have any relationship with time discounting 
behavior). Three clusters were identified.  
 
Table 5 shows the one-way ANOVA results which tested the connection 
between the identified clusters and discount rates. Thus, we have identified 
social clusters, where significantly different time discounting behavior is 
noticeable in two domains: winning money and saving lives. In these two 
domains the mean of discount rates are increasing in the order of cluster 1, 
cluster 3, and cluster 2. The main difference between clusters is along the 
change and state factors, which describe people’s attitude to environmental 
problems. The happiness factor has the lowest influence and the income factor 
had a moderate effect on clustering.  
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Table 5. One-way ANOVA for clusters 
Mean 1 2 3 Total Sig. 
winning money  
in 1 year 
0.1044 0.1785 0.1496 0.1440 0.000 
winning money  
in 3 years 
0.1091 0.1572 0.1481 0.1399 0.000 
winning money  
in 10 years 
0.1299 0.1769 0.1737 0.1634 0.000 
flood occurs  
in 1 year 
0.2862 0.3046 0.3235 0.3057 0.449 
flood occurs  
in 10 years 
0.0564 0.0367 0.0650 0.0546 0.501 
saving lives  
in 1 year 
0.0538 0.0952 0.0922 0.0816 0.003 
saving lives  
in 30 years 
0.0371 0.0600 0.0529 0.0508 0.000 
saving lives  
in 100 years 
0.0227 0.0337 0.0330 0.0300 0.000 
climate change  
costs incur  
in 10 years 
0.1747 0.1400 0.1693 0.1606 0.075 
climate change 
costs incur  
in 30 years 
0.0943 0.0843 0.0895 0.0890 0.267 
 
Table 6 shows the mean values of variables for the three clusters, where 
statistically significant differences were found. Cluster 1 contains people, who 
are typically in the highest income category, have the lowest number of children 
and their main feature is to have been largely undecided on the attitude 
questions, usually choosing the value of 3, which is the medium value between 
agree and disagree. Cluster 2 is regarded as the least well-paid category with the 
lowest qualification (skilled workers without high school graduation), but they 
usually agreed with the statements regarding environmental attitudes. Cluster 3 
is the mixture of cluster 1 and 2, but the most remarkable observation is that 
these people usually agreed with the exploitation of nature for private purposes.  
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Table 6. Means by clusters 
 1 2 3 Total Sig. 
Qualification 4.27 3.24 4.48 3.92 0.000 
State 3.64 4.20 3.37 3.78 0.000 
Private 2.99 2.99 1.41 2.46 0.000 
Innov 3.08 4.02 2.66 3.33 0.000 
Change 3.27 4.34 4.39 4.09 0.000 
Nextgen 3.45 4.64 4.94 4.44 0.000 
Number of children 1.28 1.79 1.51 1.57 0.000 
Net income (HUF) 254 406 171 862 201 515 202 806 0.000 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The paper contrasted temporal discounting in individual and social exchanges. 
The temporal exchange of different domains like money, lives and 
environmental risks have been analyzed for different time horizons.  
 
The primary aim of the study was to reveal the time discounting behavior of 
people and cluster them, based on their attributes and attitudes to environmental 
problems. For the purposes of the research, a 1000-element representative 
sample has been used. Although we dispose of a huge sample, only 
approximately one-third of respondents provided consistent, analyzable answers 
to the time preference questions. This points out how difficult it would be to 
design policies on the basis of people’s opinion regarding long-term programs 
or projects.  
 
It is clear that we cannot use the same rates over time or across different 
domains. The observed methodology of calculating social discount rates 
consists of two main parts. The first part is called pure time preference rate (p), 
which describes the attitude of people to next generations’ welfare. The second 
part makes next generations’ welfare equal with current generation’s welfare. 
This part is calculated from the product of two parameters; elasticity of 
marginal utility of consumption (e) and the growth rate of per capita real 
consumption (g) (Evans and Sezer, 2005). There are several methods for the 
calculation of each parameter, but most prevalent is the tax-based (mostly 
income tax) method for the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (Evans, 
2005) and the use of GDP as a growth rate. Our study revealed that time 
Temporal discounting in social clusters on the basis of stated preferences 151 
 
discounting behavior has no connection with gender, age and is also very 
weakly connected with qualification, happiness and life satisfaction.  
 
Regarding time discounting patterns, the strongest relationship after 
clustering was discovered between income levels and the five attitude questions 
towards the environment. Accordingly, it seems acceptable to reckon observed 
preferences on the basis of income levels (income taxes) and people’s attitude to 
next generations, which literally corresponds with the meaning of pure time 
preference rate (p). This rate is calculated based on the number of deaths 
relative to the population (this rate is called “Changing Life Chance” by Pearce 
and Ulph, (1995)) and is used in many countries to compute SDR for Cost-
Benefit Analysis. The argument for using the death rate as the expression of 
people’s attitude is absolutely refuted by our results. The ageing has no 
connection with discounting behavior, elderly people discount the same way as 
young people do. So, it can be concluded that the income level influences our 
discounting patterns which has to be considered in an SDR model and can be 
calculated top-down, but the calculation of pure time preference rates should be 
based on the interpretation of real stated preferences. 
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